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requested authorization to draw up a report on the resul-ts of the INFCE
Conference (fnternatronal Nuclear FueI CycIe Evaluation).
By Letter of 22 May 1980 the President of the European Parliament
authorrzed the Committee on Energy and Research to draw up a rePort on
thrs subject. The Political Affairs Committee was asked for its opinion.
on 2 June 1980 the Committee on Energy and Research appointed
Mr Veronesi rapPorteur.
It considered the draft report at its meetings of 20 l{arch 1981,
23 April I98I, 26 February 1982 and 29 April L982. It adopted the motion
for a resolutj.on and the explanatory statement by L2 votes to IO on
29 April 1982.
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ATheCommitteeonEnergyand.ResearchherebysubmitstotheEuropean
parliament the following motion for a resolution together with explanatory
statement:
I{OTION EOR A RESOLUTION
on the resultE of the rNFcE Conference (rnternational Nuclear FueI Cycle
nval uation)
The EuroPean Parliament,
- having regard to the report of the committee on
the opinion of the Politica] Affairs Comrnittee
- having regard to its previous resolutions'
-havingregardtotheconcludingrePortofthefinalplenaryconference
of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) and the
report of the commisEion to the council on this subject (coM(80) 316 final),
Considers the convening of the INFCE Conference a signlficant example of
international collaboration on energy problems;
values highly the scientific and technical contribution made by the
delegations of the participating countries and organizations to the
various specialist working parties;
considers the resurts obtailed to be extremery important for the guide-
lines and energy options which all countries will have to adopt lndepend-
ently in future;
calIs for due attention to be paid to the joint effort and commitment
shown in the search for a united reEponse to the problems coneidered;
Agreeswiththeapproachadoptedbytheconferenceinextendingthe
scope of the problems considered beyond that of the proliferation of
nuclear weaponsi
Draws attentlon to the considerabre progress made in the safety of provgn
reactor s i
Endorses the encouragement whlch the conference gives to the countrteE'
the reeearch organlzatlone and plant operators towards ever greater
commitment in the development of technological research to improve the
Eafel-1r of the wlierle fuel eyelel
Notes the enormous energy potential offered by fc ssile and fertile nuclear
frrel reqpfvoFl;
Notes that 'breeding' makes the nuclear materials market leEe dependent
on small areas of supply and less Eensitive to production coEts whlch
are a funetlon of the rlchnesg of depoalte;












10. Supports, with complete conviction, the proposal for intgrnqtional
agreements and collaboration on the enrichment and reprocess+$g of
nuclear fuel;
II. Notes the conclusions of the conference that:
(a) Bupports the INF'CE proposqls to establish contractual qgrgemente
by means of en initiative from the Commission, to simplify the
nuclear fuel cycle [,y increasing the invo]-vement qnd the respon-
sibility of the IAEA and to improve safety levels;
(b) no fuel cycle - in the present state of the art - is Eafer than
any other in prevenfing the military use of nuclear energyi
12. Notes the conclusions of INFCE on the levpls of risk of proliferation
connected with various cycles, and the fact that the open cycle offers
no advantage over other cycles particularly as it excludes the
reprocessfng of plutonium, and underlines the future role of the breeder
reactor in the disposal of plutonium.
13. Believes that considerabl-e emphasis must be given to two fundqpenfal
conclusions of the conference:
(a) The ever-increasing and vital importance of nuclear energy in
covering world energy needs, bearing in mind known world reserves
and the current state of research into new technologies.
(b) the need for specific measures to cope with the requirements of
the developing countri-es in the peaceful uses of nuclear energyi
14. At the political level, in fuII awareness, urges the Community decision
-making institutions to work with speed and determination, in the
various nEtional bodies, to st-rengthen and extend the IAEA's respongi-
bilities and porers of control, to which all t4ember Countries should
be subject, particularly over the use of fissile material. Fgrthermore,
to lend support and impetus to the process of progressive and
controlled nuclear disarmament, it seems essential_ to:(a) enforce fully the NPT in such a way as to secure the accession of
countrles not- yet party to the Treaty with special reference to:
- Article 4, which deals with the development of collaboration
and exchange in nuclear matters for peaceful purposes;
- Article 5 and the spirit of paragraph 12 of the preqmble,
which call for a sincere comrnitment to the ending of the
nucJear arms race and to progressive and controlled nucfear
di-sarmanent without which there wourd be no hope of avoiQing
the proliferation of nuclear weaponsi
(b) strictly li-mit any and every type of experr-mentation with nuclear
weapona, as persistently urged by the majority of the countriee
si.Enatory to the NPT and in the spirit of paragraph 11 of the
preanrble to that Treaty;
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15. At the technical and organizational fevel, calls upon the Community, in
col_Iaboration wi.th all the more advanced countries in nuclear technology,
to promote and encourage any action designed to:
(a) extend studies and research aimed at achieving i-ncreasingly higher
Ievels of safety for aII types of plants in the cycle and improved
techniques and procedural safeguards against national and sub-
national proliferation, for instance by coLocation, coconversion
and lower enrichment;
(b) improve and make suitably reliable (with an accePtable risk,/
benefits ratio) the processes for storage of wastei
(c) standardize and unify environmenLal- and civi-1, protection measures
and the design standards of plants with particulailregard to safety;
(d) establish procedures for iEproved community supervision of nuclear
Plant safetY;
(e) overcome the existing difficultj-es for the agreed selection of sites
for nuclear pl;rntI or any othcr danqerOrts plant or industry by
grawing up a map of such sites in cooperation with the Menber States
and also with those non-Communrty countries which ask to participate;
(f) prepare plans and operational- structures to cope with any emergen-
ci-es, providing for i-nternational collaborationi
(s) take steps to make aII sources of information on energy questions in
general and on nuclear energy in particular more accessible to the
public;
(h) strengthen and develop coltaboration withthe IAEA to perfect the
instruments, techniques and methodologies used for the application
of nuclear safeguards;
(i) devise an international system for the storage of unused plutoniumi.
( j) promote the developmeng on a multilateral basis if possible, of
enriching and reprocessing Plants;
16. Hopes that the conclusions of the I-NFCE Conference will firmly
establish a positive climate between the USA and Europe in relation
to their common goal of nuclear non-proliferation and between Europe
and the Third World in the desire to provide mutual help in gaining
access to this 2Oth century technology;
17. Stresses its commitment to Community procedures and, in particular, its
hopes for a positive outcome of political cooperation activities in the
field of non-profiferation and balls for the preparAtion of Community
proposals in the context of the United Nations Conference on nuclear
energy to be held in 1983;
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18. E'ina1ly points to the need, vigorously expressed many tines in previous
resglut ione :
(a) not to rely solely on nuclear energy to solve energy problems;
(b) to j.ncrease studies and investment on the use of all other
appropriate energy sourcesi
(c) to reconsider the siting of productive plants (industrial and
energy)and residential areas in line with new criteria prompted
by today's energy problems, with the aih of improving the use of
land and protecting tfre environmenti
19. Instructs its President to forward this resolution and the attached
report to the governments of the Member States, the Council and
Corunission and the Presidents or Speakers of national parliaments for
transmission to the comrnittees responsible.
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BEXPLAi{ATORY STATEMENT
I - METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH
l.WiththecompletionofthelNFcEprogrammeatitsfinalconference
in vienna on 25-27 February 1980 a wealth of material was made available
ior consultation and study to governments, inetitutions and other or-
ganizations interested in the question of nuclear energy as well as to
the public at large.
Eight reports were produced in as many volumes together with a




up by conrmentaries, studies and theses of an unequal quality.
Newspapers throughout the world have carried reports which vary
between pure news stories and attempts to make a political assessment
of the conclusions of the conference'
Journals special izing in industrial economics, energy policy or
politicsalone(particularlyinternationalpol-ities)andscientific
periodicals covering various disciplines have inade a more thorough
appraisal of the problems raised by the INFCE' Viewing the subject
from various angles - economic, industrial, technical, military,
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ecological etc. - critical- ana!.yses have been made attempting to assess
the impact of the INFCE on the world scene" Ilere too some thousands of,
pages have been produced.
3. The INFCE, of course, did not come into being spontaneous3-y f.ike
Minerva springing forth from Jupiter's head. It has a history which
will be reviewed briefly below.
The decision to hold the conference came after a long technical,
but more particularly political debate: it was the compromise which
made it possible to ease international tension on the political and
economic problems connected with nuclear energy. It has provided a
pause for thought during which all the interested parties have trled
to gain a better and deeper uhderstandlng of their own problems and
those of othere and to question and perhaps revise their previ.ous assump-
tions. Throughout this stage and in the troubled months which preceded
it, an enormous amount of current affairs writing and specialized literature
was produced.
These agaln ran into thousands of pages.
4. Finally, it should not be forgotten that the'nuclear issue' was
brought to the attention of political parties and public opinion in
a traumatic way on 6 August 1945 (Hiroshima). It had already been
known to the most advanced scientific circles since 1939 (date of the
discovery of uranium fission) and the hlghest levels of government in
some countries as from 2 December 1942, the day the first nuclear reactor
went critical in Chicago.
In the immedlate post-war period it was one of the main topics of
debate betweerr nationg both irr international forums (uN, ceneva etc. )
and as part of their bil-ateral relations, and it certainly lnfluenced
the cnurse of political events. l4oreover, the particular problem of
nuclear weapons and thelr banning was taken up as a cause by mass move-
ments across the world, spurred on and supported by a large number of
highly-qualified scientists and cultural figures.
The military and political consequences of atomic energy (the title
used by the Nobel PrLze winner, P.M. S. Blackett, for his famous work in
L947) were the subject of numerous and extended critical analyses on
military aud economic strategy and the strategy of international relatl-ons.
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An imposing number of books and papers were produced, forming, as
it were, the background documents needed for a proper appraisal of the
results of the INFCE.
5. Your rapporteur felt it necessary to lay down a methodological
approach for his work.
This approach, which will now be defined, must be understood before
reading and evaluating the present report. Tt stems solely from a personal
vision of the problems we are to consider; it does not claim to be the only
possible, one, nor the best, nor even to be completely satisfactory. The
rapporteur's zeal can therefore be judged not only by the results, but aLso
by the consistency between his methodology and the content of his exposition.
6" The essentials are as follows:
(a) The report, or rather the explanatory statement accompanying the
resolution, was kept short in spite of the breadth of the subject
under review. This is always to be recommended, and is usually possible,
when documents and their authors already exist to which one may, as in the
present case, refer.
(b) The content of the report is substantiarry poritical, since the
institution (the European parliament) in which it is beinq discussed is a
political one. There are not as a consequence any technorogical ex-
pJ-anations (these can be supplied by the competent directorate-general of
the Community) unless they are needed to clarify the general discussion.
Some notes are provided in the Appendix.
(c) The report does not, at the rapporteur's personal suggestion, attempt
to sum up the resulte of the INFCE. As mentioned above, the conference
produced a report in eight volumes plus an excellent summary in a ninth.
This contains a highly condensed resum6 of facts and figures which affords
a complete view of the subject and, in the first 70 pages or so, a general
outline of the conclusions of the Conference.
The staff of the competent directorates-general have dra-wn up two
concise summaries of the ninth volume: Documents PE 64.962 of 7 May 1980
and coll(80) 316 finar of 11 Juae |980. rn view of the immensity of the
PE 7o. 857 /fin.-1r-
Eubject, its comptexity and the multiplicity of the topics dealt with,
it seems improbably that one courd make a better effort at a summary
of a summary within a reasonable number of pages. These two documents,
to which the rapporteur attaches great importance, wiII therefore be
consid.ered an integral part of this report. Particular attention should
be paid to the section dealing with the aims, work done and undertakings
given by the stateE and organizations participating in the rNFcE con-
ference. Fortunately, Document coM(90) 316 final quotes these in full
from the report by the Technical Coordinating committee to the rNFCE
final conference which is reproduced as the introduction to the summary
volume. The rapporteur will deal with them point by point in part trr of
this report- The same criterion will be appried to the eight working
groups on specific subjects into which the conference was divid.ed.
(d) Many questions in some way connected with the rNFcE have arready
been discussed separately (or are now und.er consideration) by our
committee and by parliament since the direct elections. one need. only
refer to the Fuchs, Linde, Weber, Seligman and Ippolito reports.
These documents and the debates following them provide precedents
which make it possible to advance more rapidry in dearing with the
problems now under review.
II - POLITICAL ORIGINS OF THE INFCE
7. To understand the origins and purpose of the INFCE
must reconstruct the various stages in the evolution of





rn making this historical reconstruction one should never lose sight
because of its obvious influence on past and present international re-
lations - of the military origin of nuelear energy and the concept of
'power' which attaches to it.
This i.nescapable fact means that, whenever one consid.ers and analyses
these matters, one has to bear in mind the complex shifts in the re_
lative military strengths of the world powers since l{or1d war rr"
Furthermore, the most important part of the rI$FCE report 
- in the
rapporteur's opinion 
- and that on which public opinic,n is expressing
the greatest concern 
- is certainly the problcm of the proliferation of
nuclear weapons.
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This verY brief historical
recent and universallY known.
origins of the INFCE conference
the conclusions.
digression lists facts which are quite
Its sole aim is to show clearly the political
since this will make it easier to understand
g. on the ,nuclear issue' the united states has played a preponderant
role (much more important than those of all other countries put together)
which for a long time was the decisive one'
In the early 1950's, confident of its superiority in nuclear armaments
(Hiroshima and Nagasaki had approved the power of the new weaPons and the
USSR had only just become familiar with mititary nuclear technology), the
United States was intensiveJ-y promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy
in both the cultural and economic spheres'
(a) In December 1953 at the end of a wide-scale campaign in favour of
nuclear energy, President Eisenhower launched the famous 'Atoms for peace'
programme while speaking before the uN Assembly'
(b) At the end of 1954 congress proceeded to amend the McMahon act (Atomic
Energy Act) passed in 1946 which laid down that all nuclear activities and
research had to be conducted in secret. The amendments resulted in per-
mission being given for the transfer to allied countries of fissile materials'
plant and information for the peaceful use of nuclear energy.
The proposal originated with the collapse of the Baruch plan (for a long
time set against the Gromyko plan) for UN supervision of nuclear enelgy'
The American president's proposal was for a limit to fissile material pro-
duction and the creation of an international body which would have facitities
and powers to promote and supervise the use of nuclear energy for peaceful
purposes. Later, after difficult negotiations, the second proposal Ied to
the creation in L957 of tho International Atomic Energy ngency (IAEA) '
(c) In the summer of 1955, as a result of this'new policy and a thaw in
East-West relations, an international conference was held in Geneva on the
peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Euphoria and optimism spread throughout
the world since it held out the prospect of an unlimited and happy develop-
ment of the human condition.
g. In June 1955 the six ECSC foreign ministers meeting in Messina took
the decision to create a community institution for gthe devel-opment of
atomic energy for peaceful ends' which in the short term would open up
,the prospect of a new industrial revolution without comparison in recent
yearst.
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Three specialists 
- the 'committee of Three wise Men, - drew up
a suggested programme for the six (but having also heard the opinions
of interested circres in the usA, the united Kingd.om and canada). From
this sprang the E:trEC (EURATOM) which was given in*ltutional force by
the Treaties of Rome in 1957 and which was intended to give rise to a
t strong European nuclear industry, 
.
This initiative appeared to
crisis, which was the first sign
Mlddle.Edstern oil supplies.
a long-term reply to the 1956 Suez
the instability and uncertainty of
be
of
10. The now American policy was cLearly intended to permit the industrial,
commercial and economic exploitation of the preciouE know-how-accumulated
during the building of nuclear weapons, although eongress imposed stringent
conditions on the transfer of technorogy and flssire materi-al.
1r- v\rhat was racking wag any sizeable demand for it. oil supplied most
energy needs (unti-l 1973 the market price was about g2 per barrel).
Nuclear power was much more expensive and, in fact, not even the indus_
trialized countries at that time had sufficient technical personnel to
handle thie new and complex technology to any great extent.
rn addition, those countries which might have provided the first
markets for the United States (France, United Kingd,om, west cermary,
ilapan, canada, rtaly, etc. ) began work on their own nationar nucrear
Programmes, some of which were based on reactor systems very different
from the water reactors deveroped in the usA- This appli-es in partic-
urar to the British, canadian and French programmes, although rater,
at the end of the r96os, France opted for deveropment of the American
t echnology.
This situation, made possibre by the row price of oir at that time,
enabled these countries to escape an oppressive , technol0gical hegemony, 
.
over a period of 15 years they acquired sufficient know-how, technology
and personnel in the nuclear and related sectors to enter the world market 
-
which had by then consid.erably expanded 
- as credible competitors withthe us- The us stilr had one decisive factor in its favour 
- readilv
available uranium suppries and adequate enrichment facilities.
rn spite of this the American share of inte:-r-.atic,i,ii orders for
nuclear Power stations fell from g5% to 4O/o !.._)_u,eeit L972 and 1976.
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Although they planned to sell- between 800 and I,000 | provens reactors
on rhe world market by the year 2000 under virtually monopoly con-
ditions, more up to da'te estimates suggest that this number will not
be much greater than 100 (partly because of the slowing-down in nuclear
expansion) and that there will be very strong competition"
L2. Under these changed circumstances it has become more difficult
since the beginning of the 1970's to strike a fair balance between the
need to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and the greater
good and the acutely felt need to prevent its military use.
The limitations of the IAEA's supervisory activity, the inadequa-
cies of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NpT, signed by the USA, the USSR
and the United Kingdom in 1968)1 and the more recent emergence of new
countries having nuclear armaments (or able to acquire 'bhem rapidty)
and not subscribing to the NPT harre compllcated the question even further"
The testing of the Indian nuclear bomb in 1974 gave rise to much
controversy throughout .the world, being set as it was against the
serious and inexorable oil cri sis which broke out with the Yom Kippur war.
13" A conference vras convened in Washington on 11 Februaxy L974 to
discuss the oi1 siLuation and this led to the initialling of an agreement
in Paris on 18 November 1974 leading to the creation of the International
Energy Agency (ffa1 (France was not a party the the agreement) 
-
At the request of the US a further conference was held in London in fSiE-- -
to make a close examination of the new nucLear situation. Fourteen
countries from the West and from the socialist bloc having the technological
and industrial capaeity Lo export pJ-ant and sensitive material capabJ-e
of being used also for non-peaceful purposes took part (the'club of
London') 
"
An attempt was made to reach agreement on precise limits and con-
ditions to be attaehed to nuclear supplies which wouLd provide some
guarantee against proliferation"
L4. An agreement was reached, but a bitter argument between the US on
one hand and France and West Germany on the other limited ite scope anC
intrinsic value. Essentiarry the American position was ludged to be an
attempt 
- notwithstanding their deerara'tions of principle regarding
security - to preserve t:heir own nucrear superiority in both the
military sphere (not indeed easy to undermine) and the industrial and
commercial spheres"
I Mo.u than 100 countries subsequently signe,J the treaty"
the
its
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The deveroping countries 
- or those in which industrialization
was advancing most rapidly 
- shared this vievr of the American
position.
I 5- Another cause of difference between the us and the other
countries was its decision not only to reiect but to work t.o prevent
the I Plutonium eeonomy' . Announced officially by presid.ent Ford
in octobex L976 and later adopted and developed by president carter,
the new American nuclear policy carred for a ban on plant for re-
processing spent nuclear f.uers and an indefinite moratorium on sales
of f,ast breeder reactore.
This decision too clashed with the interests of .Tapan, the USSR
and western industriarized nations as well as the deveroping countries.All of these fert it was the prod.uct of the position of privilege
which reEted on the ready availability to the us of uranium and other
energy sources and was confirmation of the Americans' intention to
control the industrial development of other countries.
16- From an objective and honest assessment of the facts one may
perhaps, in the rapporteur's opinion, conclude that :
(a) There was and is a rear possibility of the internationar
political order being destabirized by the proliferation of nuclear
armament s;
(b) The united states was concerned to defend the technorogical
hegemony and industrial supremacy it had established in the post-
war period over other countries.
'l'1 
" This confused situation had a number of results" The first was
the suspension of uranium supplies by canada as from 1 January 1977 andthe increasing difficulties with American exports of enriched uranium"
The second was a vigorous and unified proto€t- by the nuclearcountries of the comnrunity. on the one hand they approached the
USSR for uranium suppries (between 1975 and 1976 there ha.d been eri
increase in imports from that country of 3g%, but becween r;76 and
1977 they increased by L71 "6%) and, on the other, .i._ r.:;,trr to
press the United States to change its pos.:.. 
-un
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18. President Carter launched the idea of the INFCE on I ApriL 1977
and. included it in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Bill he sent to Congress
on 27 April 1977 
"
In taking this action, Carter had no intention of giving up his
nuclear policy but he was able to defer a posslble embargo and maintain
enriched Uranium supplies to EEC countries (EUItATOM) until the work of the
Conference t{as cdncluded.
The United States undertook:
(a) to consider the Conference asr a meeting open to all nations and
institutione which wished to be present, thus going.far beyond the
restricted framework of the Club of London;
(b) not to aek the participating countries to make any change in their
nuclear policy during the two-year period of the work;
(c) not to consider the conclusions of the Conference to be binding
on any country;
(d) to refrain from renegotiating existing agreements on nuclear
cooperation, as required by the Act, until the work was finished.
It was in a similar spirit that Canada resumed its Uranium
supplies to EUMTOM under a cooperation agreement containing a clause
val-id until 31 December l98O1which made implementation of the chapter
on safeguards (Chapter C) depend.ent on the results of the INFCE.
It shouLd be remembered that the countries with which the US
was negotiating within the INFCE were necessarily influenced by the
measure which Carter had proposed to Congress and which was ratified
as part of the hew American nuclear strategyr in March 1978.
This provided for a series of particularly drastic measures, including:
(a) the rule of prior authorization for reprocessing fuel of American
origin or enriching fuel of the same origin beyond 20"/.; this is
ln marked contrast with the conditions negotiated with the US
at the beginning of the 1960s and incorporated in the current US-
Euratom agreements scheduled to expire in 1995; ,
(b) a total embarqo on nuclear supplies if the parties to the nuclear
cooperation agreements in force have not demonstrated their readiness
to renegotiate them $rithin two years of this law coming into foree
(although this time limit may be extended by the US president).
1 E*te.rd.d in November I9B0 to the end of 1981 pending new agreements on
which work is continuing.
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19. The American President's prol-- sal for
on the fuel cycle was accepted in p::J-nciple
in London on 7/8 l,lay 1977" The inaugural conference of the f,NFCE was
held in Washington on 19-21 October L977.
20. It would not be right politically, intellectually or morafly
to ignore or undsrvalue the pressure from the anti-nuclear movement
which indirectly helped to bring the INFCE Conference about.
It is certainly true that in recent years there have been signs-
that the industrial-ized countries (East and West) have been having
second thoughts about nuclear energy in general. The need for this
reappraisal was felt first of all withil the decision-making nuclear
organizations (technical, economic and pollt,ical) whlch recognd.zed
the need to make a thorough check of all the implications of the
'nuclear economyt 
"
The quantitative expansion 
- though less than forecast - and
the improvement in quality of nuclear plant have widened the existing
problems and created new ones of equar and perhaps greater comprexity.
We can now speak of a I second era! in the nuclear question"
A much stronger and more widespread spur to reflection, however,.
came - as we have said - from the protest movements. Leaving aside
the doubts cast by some on the origins and inspiration of these
movements (but not on the good faith of the mass of their membership)
based on when and where they first appeared, your rapporteur has always
felt and often stated his eonviction that anti-nuelear protest - and
ecological protest in general 
- should be recognized as complementarv
and useful at the present stage of development.
This has indeed been remarked upon and emphasized by attentive
and qualified students of the subject. It is complementary in that
the objectives of the anti-nuclear lobby and of the people who design,
build and operate the plants are the same: they are both concerned to
make a careful and increasingly rigorous appraisal of nuclear develop-
ment and its place within a proper energy strategy, respecting both
economic and social imperatives.
It is useful since it stimulates the interchange of ideas and
a continuar examination of the options taken by the authorities in
implementing nuclear programmes, particularly with regard to t,he
problems of safety and the protection of man and the environment.
Finally, the anti-nuclear movement has certainly brought attention
to bear on aII the other possible sources of energy. This has helped





the WeEtern Summit held
- r5 - PE 70 "857 ttin "
It is your rapporteur's belief that this useful confrontation
of ideas - when it is conducted as a serious, constructive and
informed debate - does bring one to the objective conclusion that it
is not possible to abandon nuclear energy without causing:
(a) a serious and traumatic regression in the economic Arowth of
the advanced countries;
(b) a halt to progress in the developing countries of the third anci
fourth worlds which would be dangerous r and have many serious
consequences.
There are al so the conclusions reached by the important s'cr-r,3
published by the US National Academy of Sciences in January 1980.
The 783 pages of this report list the reasons why industrial -zeu
societies will not be able to forego nuclear energy over the nexi
half century.
The real issue is how to enable the people to make informed
and responsible decisions on the expansion and improvement of nuclea,.
pIant.
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III - POLITICAL AMLYSIS OF THE RESULTS OF THE INFCE
A. gEler3l comment s
2L. fhe general summary report and the eight reports from the
working groups were approved (or not contested) by al_r the deregations
from the states and organizations particlpating in the work. No
minority reports were submitted on any topic.
This result is extremely important poritically. without doubt
it owes eomethlng to the 6pen and general (but not superficial) nature
of the obJectives fixed in advance as condi-tions for holding the
conference, but it arso betokens a poritical wiLl for dialogue,
understanding and agreement amongst the delegations present. Every
effort was made to minimize the area of disagreement and to widen
the area of consensus as much as possible.
rn view of the initial positions taken up on the nuclear issue,
the outcome was perhaps beyond expectation and testifies to the con-
cern and the sense of responsibility with which the issues were tackled.
rt may constitute a valid basis for further steps to hart
proliferation of nuclear weapons, to outlaw and abolish them,





22 - The probrems facing alr societies today (rising popuration, hunger,
the social, cultural and political development of backward countrles)
cannot be solved simply with abundant energy a1one, particularly if it
is produced without adequate measures to protect health and the environ-
ment and, at the same time and with the same commitment, a strong effort
to preserve peace.
As has already been ably
in the reports of the Club of
of devel-opment for industrial
values of civitian consumption
(EEC Ferrero report, IIN Brandt
demonstrated in aIl the studies contained
Rome, there is a need to rethink the plan
societies,to reformulate the scale of
and to bridge the North-South gap
report) 
.
Nevertheless the fact remains that the energy probrem exists,
that it is a worrying one and that it wilr not be exorcised by evading
reality (even if this is done with the best intentions and. in the purest
of good faith). A solution wiII not be possible, at 1east over the
next 50 years, without there being a nuclear component.
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i23" Some experts clpim to have discovered a certain 'ambiguity'
the INFCE summary report. They feel that it offers two possible
readings which are almost at complete variance with one another:
the first is that technological development is advancing in such
vray as to al-low the use of Plutonium and highly enriched Uranium
as a nuclear fuel without any danger and the second is that such
a prospect involves an unacceptable risk of the proliferation of
nucLear weapons.
Your rapporteul did not perceive this ambiguity. In his opinion
the report adopts a correct and objective methodological approach,
pointing out the basic facts and conditions and hypotheses on which
the conclusions are based.
Since the Conference did not set itself the task of defining rules
or regulations but only of making a thorough examination of the question
of non-proliferation, its business was able to proceed without being
made subject to any conditions and in a climate of maximum objectivity.
24 . In order to e>lptain the 'ambiguity' that some have seen, it is
perhaps necessary to give consideration to a factor which may almost
seem an anticipated 'conclusion'.
Let us suppose for one moment that a total ban has been imposed on
the peaceful development of nuclear energy. Could we then say we had
removed the dangers of proliferation? The answer is definitely no.
Nuclear bombs roere built well before kWh were produced from Uranium
and Plutonium fisslonl
On the other hand, one might ask: might the peaceful development of
nuclear energy create additional danqers of proliferation? The answer
in this case is g, at least as a general rule.
1n
Action must therefore be
by adopting those measures of
nature which the INFCE study I
taken to minimize this additional danser
a technical and (particularly) a political
has examined and discussed.
However, all of this changes the essence of the problem not one jot
or tittle. Anyone who imagines it can be solved by ignoring the important
role which nuclear energy can play in resolving the energy problem had
better think again. The proliferation problem would remain substantially
the same and it would then become clear to everyone that the real and
final answer had to be a political one.
B. ggEp3r-ts9!-98-!!9-M!leI-p9!r!19!s
25- As already mbntioned in the second part, the substantial change in
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American poricy on the nuclear issue became evident during the 1976
presidential election campaign and took on precise from in March I97g
with the adoption of the Nucrear Non-proliferation Act. rn fact the
review process had begun in L974 with at first discreet and then more
outspoken support from Canada and Australia.
26' The oir crisis in the winter of L973/74 had spurred all countries
to rook for new energy policies to cope with something which was not
simply a cycrical shortage but which indicated that a state of emergency
would exist for a 1ong time to come.
President Ford, in his state of the union message to congress on
1 January L974, dedicated half of his remarks to the new energy
situation and the measures needed to deal with it, and all nations,
industrialized or semi-industrialized, tried to obtain reliable forecasts
of what would happen if certain programmes were put into effect.(Particularly werl known in the united. states was the Freeman report
sponsored by the Ford Foundation which appeared at the end of Lg74.
rt considered three scenarios based on possibre growth levers of the
gross domestic product and corresponding energy consumption which it
labelIed historical growth, rational_ized growth and zero growth. )
while recognizing the need for severe economies (which in fact proved
extremely difficult to introduce and implement and whose results were
largely unsatisfactory), most nations considered the development of
nuclear energy to be an essential component of any future energy policy.
27 - In this complex situation it seemed that there would be an expansion
of the nuclear market (fissile materials, plant, technologies) only onepart of which (fuer) was controlred by the united. states and even thisposition was being eroded by the Europeans having opted in favour of fast
breeder reactors.
The rndian test raised American alarm still further and convinced
them of the need for a new policy.
2a' The case put forward by the Americans was essentially that events
had raised a regitimate doubt that preventive and supervisory measures
ri'ere not effective against the diversion of nucrear materials by governments
or terrorist organizations for manufacturing arms. Thus, rather than creatlnga more efficient legal, technological and operational network, a more drastic
sorution was needecr and this was to stop the use of highly enriched
uranium in research reactors, to cease prutonium production and not toput any breeder reactors on the market. Furthermore, they said, existing
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fuel enrichment and reprocessing plant serving nuclear power stations
built to produce electricity should be put under international super-
vision and all spent fuel should be collected there.
29. There were a number of general political and economic (but mainly
political) considerations underlying these proposals" Nuclear energy








of limited importance to world economic devel-opment;
be used only as a last and extreme solution;
at the very most, a means of bridging the gap between traditional
sources of energy and those of the future (of which there is only
a vague notion at present) " In fact, provided that a sensible and
reasonable nuclear policy (proven open-cycle reactors), supplies
of natural uranium (and hence v235) will be adequate for many
years to come and it will not be necessary to resort to known breeder
reactors unless they are needed at some time in the future which we
cannot predict at the moment.
Under these circumstances the United. States undertook to assure
supplies of fuel and technological assistance and to study aLternative
cycles for breeder reactors which would not necessitate the production
and uEe of pure Plutonium which is the ideal material for military
devices. Furthermore it promised to join in plans to assist the develop-
ing countries to exploit nuclear energy for peaceful ends.
30. The points of divergence between the United States and the indus-
trialized countries interested in nuclear energy (not all of them members
of the Community) arose for four quite different reasons which may be
summed up as follows :
the precariousness and uncertainty of the oi1 market for countries
obliged to import massive quantities of crudet
the absence of their own reliable alternative energy sources
(except for coal which is very expensive to use);
(c) their assessment of the role of nuclear energy in the development
of their economiesi
(d) the need to escape from total dependence on uranium suppliers by
introducing fast breeder reactors and reprocessing.
At the same time they felt that international talks had to take
place before any solution could be found to the problems of the diver-
sion of material-s and the proliferation of nuclear weapons. It was
these differences that the INFCE Conference was asked to resolve.
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31. Your rapporteur must point out here that there was no conflict
hetween the United States (and canada) and the other nuclear or pro-
nuclear countries over the questions of physical security or the
protection of man and the environmenE., which rightly took and still
take such an important place in the public debate.
A11 polemic aside, this does mean that the vast majority of INFCE
participants implicitly acknowledged that the present level of nuclear
technology in all its forms offers sufficient safeguards for this sort
of energy to be accepted. The INFCE itself went beyond this argument.
The Conference and its etudy groups looked at a far broader range of
questions partly in order to live up to the legitimate expectations
of the public who were worried and uncertain. This wider outlook
makes the final report that much valuable.
The most lEpgr! 3!! 
-r-e ss!! s-9 g-! b9- INE g-E
32. As stated above, a summary of the most important results of
the INFCE is contained in the two documents PE 54"962 and cOM(80) 316
final.
The rapporteur believes that these documents have been well
produced and give an understandable and fairly complete outline
of the work of the Conference. It would therefore be superfluous
(and wasteful) to make another summary here which would certalnly
not be any better. The rapporteur therefore suggests that read.ers
refer to the documents themselves to gain an overall impression of
the content of the INFCE. He for his part will simply quote and
make general comments on the conclusions which he feels are the most
important. First amongst these is certainly the question of the pro-
liferation of nuclear weapons and this will be the subject of the
fourth part of the present report.
33. It will not escape anyone's attention, even after the most
cursory examination, that the central point of controversy and
politically the most important Part of the argument surrounding
nuclear energy is the problem of controlling the use of fissile
material and the proliferation of nuclear weapons. A11 other questions,
however much they may be of concern to public opinion and in spite
of their indisputable importance, are subsidiary to the fundamental
question of the military use of nuclear energy.
Atomic weapons have, in current jargon, modified the scale of
the problems of disarmament, security and peace by several orders of
magnitude by making them enormously more complicated- As your rap-
porteur has already pointed out, this was the controversy which led
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to the planning and holding of the INFCE Conference"
(A) 34. The ]NFCE report comes to the conclusion that in the present
economic and sOcial situatiOn (resourceS, consumPtion, demand and
development) the world economy as a whole cannot do without nuclear
energy" TI-re decision which has to be made is not whether nuclear
energy has to be used but to what extent, in what way, over what time
scale and with what safeguards it will have to be used.
35. For the industrialized countries the prospect is certainly fading -
for a night which may be withou" dawn - that historical qrowth will
continue with a constant increase in GDP of about 3-4% and unrestricted
energy supplies (dvnamic hvpothesis of energy consumption).
16. A more reasonable plan might be for rational qrowth involving an
annual GDP increase of about L"5-2% supported by vigorous action to
improve its elasticity and leaving the quality of consumption unchanged.
It presupposes research into new technologies and the introduction of
more advgnced production methods to obtain acceptable growth without
demanding a corresponding increase in energy availability (static
hVpothesis of energy consumption). No real precedent exists for such
a change and there will have to be adequate research into the optimiza-
tion of systems together with investment for the conversion of pro-
ductive plant.
37. Finally one might envisage a situation of zero qrowth based on a
very slight increase in GDP and a reduction in energy consumPtion
(negative elasticity) " It implies far-reaching rationalization of
production processes and a Profound change to the quality of con-
sumption. Given the present conditions, if this economic but, above
all, cultural and civil transformation were to take place, forceful
action would have to be taken to alter collective and individual-
behaviour within industrialized societies. The traumas involved in
having these measures accepted and put into practice can easily be
imagined.
38. Last of alL, one should point out that none of these schemes can
be applied to the developing countries. They need rapid Progress but
they cannot and must not uncritically follow the example of the more
advanced countries. They should profit by the latter's experience and
reject the contradicitions and distortions which have caused their
development to degenerate.
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39. whichever development model i-s chosen, one must be able in the
medium and long terms to count on an adequate supply of energy and a
sizeable proportion of this will have to be nuclear.
The nature of nucrear energy, which at present can only be used
for the production of electricity] reinforces its role and importance.
There are two closely connected reasons for this" Firstly, the
inevitable shift of energy consunption towards electricity means that plans
must be made to meet an increase in the demand for el-ectricity which will be
ouch greater than that for other forms of energy. Secondly, nuclear energy can
replace the oil and. gas now used in elect.ricity production and allow
the countries who have few energy resources of their own to diversify
their supplies of raw materials.
This of course does not mean one has to accept nuclear energy as
the one and only eolution"
(B) 40. while the INFCE conference was not explicitly instructed to study
the questions of safety and protection, its report d.oes come up with
objective findings" In your rapporteur's opinion, it has demonstrated
that sufficient technologicar progress has been made in the operation
and control of prant as to ensure their reliability in service"
Probability assessments, statistics and historical analyses would seem
to show that t.he balance of risks and benefits is an acceptable one"
4L. Although this concrusion formulated in this way may shock public
opinion (which has never before been carled upon to judge the meaning
or national basis of such a balance), it is the only logical one and
it is extremely useful.
This is because firstly it clearry identifies the points where
greater efforts are needed to improve the ratio of benefits to risks
and, secondly, because any other option has to be judged by the same
yardstick so as to strike the same balance while taking into account
all the technical, eonomic and social variables.
The Conference on Nuclear plant Safety, organized by the IAEA in
Stockholm on 20-24 october 1980 at the request of the INFCE Conference,
substantially confirmed this view. Mature and reliable technologies
are already available to deal with those subjects which are most often
under discussion today, such as the storage of waste"
1 rts use in the production and distribution of heat is stirl verylimited, although the prospects for this are far from negligibll.
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42. [Iave all the problems associated with nuclear energy therefore been
overcome? No, they still exist and the INFCE has pinpointed them rather
than covered them up. The report shows that a lot of research work is
being done on them.
In any case the problem of safety cannot be resolved once and for
all, since there is no such thing as absolute safety. As with all
machinery (cars, aeropl-anes, trains, ships, therapeutic and diagnostic
health devices; the last of which was the subject of the recent Krouwel-
VIam report to the EP), there is a need for continual improvement.
43. Where there is still room for vigorous demclcratic action is in
providing the public with correct information, guaranteeing it access
to the supervision of plant management and checking the coverage and
efficiency of measures to be taken in a large-scale emergency. These
are clearly extremely political matters which require political solutions
based on the spirit and the practice of democracy (but leaving demagogy
aside) .
(C) 44. The IMCE rport states that at the present time it is not
possible to single out any one cycle that is more economic than the
others. There are too many slocal' factors specific to individual
countries to make it possible to give a general answer.
Another point established is that the recycling of spent fuel in LltR
reactors to be used again in the same reactor is of limited economic
advantage, even if it does mean less dependence on the market for fuel
suppl ie s.
Once the enormous investment costs during the present experimental
phase have been paid, breeder reactors hold out good prospects for ending
the dependence on supplies of fissile material. Here the reprocessing
of spent fuel is not an option but an inherent characteristic of the system.
It should also be pointed out that the use of breeding makes the cost
of electricity produced by a nuclear posrer station much less sensitive to
the costs of extraction of the uranium, at the same time increasing the
volume of the available resources. 'Poor' deposits (Iike sea-water, in
which there are 3.5 tonnes U/t*3) can be utllized; this also extende the
areas of ore production and reduces the importance of the 'producer countries' .
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It may be worthwhile here to emphasize a point which is all too
often overlooked. Plutonium production is not something which is
peculiar to fast reactors. As stated in the description of the fuel
cycles above, Plutonium is produced by any reactor, thermal- or fast,
,h.. u238is irradiated.
What is peculiar to fast reactors is the need to recycle the
Plutonium produced and consequently the presence of Pl-utonium in these
segments of the cycle which precede irradiation.
The 'Plutonium economy' is not something exclusive to fast reactoxs.
It is always present, but is more evident when this system is used.
45. while discussing the possible effects in its conclusions, the IMCE
does not support the American request that the t Plutonium economyr and
the development of these reactors should be stopped"
It is your rapporteur's opinion that this technology has perhaps
not yet reached commercial maturity, although experiments have been
going on for some years with exceLlent results. The Community must
maintain its research effort and prudently but resolutely encourage
Community cooperation in this sector. The factors arguing for this
are Lhe meagreness of the Community's own resources and the need to
reduce its dependence on third countries as far as possible.
(D) 46. The INFCE report gives some consideration to the problems of
nuclear energy in the developing countries. These countries themselves
are not all alike and in fact show great differences in their growth
rates, culture, industry, infrastructures and natural resources.
The proposal to create an International Technology Centre under
IAEA supervision would seem to provide a good opportunity for a proper
transfer of know-how, aid and assistance in the nuclear field to these
countries" It therefore deserves Community support and in fact a
thorough discussion of the matter was held in the spring of L979
(Fltsmig report).
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IV - THE PROBLEM OF THE PROLIFEMTION OF NUCLEAR AR}4AUENTS
A- Two tvpes of Proliferation
47. One must flrst of all distinguish between vertical proliferation and
horizontal proliferation.
Vertical proliferation is mainly the preserve of the United States
and the ussR, but may also involve other powers having nuclear weapons.
It is the frantic competition to find weapons which are more sophisticated
and more efficient than those currently in service-
The fission bomb has given way to a fusion device (thermonuclear or
H bomb) of much greater power, rockets (ballistic missiles) with multiple
warheads have been developed for strategic and 'theatre' use, fleets of
nuclear-powered submarines (for wider range) have been armed with missiles
with nuclear warheads, special aircraft have been constructed to carry
nuelear bombs and a neutron bomb is being designed and may already be
at the testing stage.
It is a well-known fact that the stocks of nuclear explosive devices
avail-abte to the United States and the USSR have reached such numbers and
are of such quality as to make it difficult to judge their relative supremacy.
tr{hat is absolutely certain is that the destructive power lying in those
arsenals is more thancrough to destroy the world and no area of the 91obe
ean be considered to be outside the target zone.
The two superpowers watch over and direct their military aPparatuses
with an extraordinary number of reconnaissance satellites backed up with
a close network of radar stations and computers.
48 . The World Armaments and Disarmament SIPRI Year Book of June 1980
notes the fol-lowing facts :
(a) the world, s nuclear military arsenals now contain more than
60,000 nuclear weaPons;
(b) three quarters of the satellites put into orbit by the end of
1979 were for mil-itary PurPosest
(c) in 1979, 53 nuclear test explosions were carried out (a11 under-
ground)z2EbytheUSSR,15bytheUS,gbyFranceandlbytheIJK;
(d) The total number of nuclear explosions uP to the end of 1979 was
L,22L,ofwhichT33tookplaceafterthesigningoftheTestBan
Treaty which prohibited nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, in
water and in space, but not underground (August 1963) which was
initialled by the US, the USSR and the IJK.
-29- PE 70. 857 /t irL.
(e) The United States is at present developing and installing the
MX mobile missile, the Trident submarine and the Cruise missile,
whilst the USSR is preparing the SSI7, SS18, SS19 and SS2O.
49. vertical proliferation would therefore seem to involve only the
two superpowers who are working to preserve their supremacy over other
countries and not let themselves be overtaken by the other.
other countries are to varying degrees berow the level. where they
can compete and, in their case, the notion of proliferation d.oes not
have quite the same meaning.
The us and the ussR have certainly for some years bepn aware of
their role and their responsibilities. The Test Ban Treaty was followed
by the Non-Proliferation Treaty (Npr) initiarled in I July 1968 and
open for signature to all countries.
The non-ratification of SALT 2 by the us senate and the tensions
created by the Afghanistan crisis between the two countries have seriously
slowed down the nast,/West dialogue on nuclear (and general) disarmament.
50. Horizontal proliferation means an increase in the number of countries
having nuclear weapons. Some time ago the United Kingd.om, followed by
France and more recently china and rnd.ia acquired such weapons and the
technology necessary to manufacture them. other countries such as
canada, South African, Brazil, Israel, pakistan, Iraq and many in-
dustrialized countries in East and West Europe would be able, should
they so wish, to do so quite rapidly. Of eourse, the quantity and
quarity involved would not compare with the arsenals of the two super-
powers, but the possibility is no less worrying for that.
The INFCE has analysed this problem in connection with fuel cycles
and political non-proliferation measures.
B. Ile-g1ss19!-!9s!
51. rn simple terms a nuclear fission bomb is made up of a quantity
of fissife material which is sufficient to produce a 'supercritical'
configuration but which is initially maintained in a ,subcrical,
geometrical arrangement. If an impulse (of the order of microseconds)
compacts the mass of material and into this mass are injected neutrons,
the conditions are created for reactivity much higher than the ,critical,
leve1 and a chain react.ion begins which reads to an explosion.
-30- PE 70.857/fin.
There are quite a few difficulties which have to be overcome
before these conditions can be created and it seems scareely credible
that such a device - if one had the fissile material - could be built
without the technology, without adequate equipment and without familiarity
with the subject or with nuclear science in general.
Your rapporteur is not convinced that an atomic bomb could be put
together on the kitchen table by a terrorist or a group of terrorists.
52. To understand the aspects of this problem considered by the INFCE
it may be useful to recal-l the minimum quantities of fissile material
required for an atom bomb. These are shown in Table I in the Appendix-
It will be seen that, in the case of military or even commercial
Plutonium, the quantities are extremely small. In view of the high
density of Plutonium such quantitieE will take up no more space than
a tennis baII.
In the case of Uranium, the less it is enriched, the greater the
required mass, making it difficult to acquir e and use.
Although it is impossible to go into the technicalities here, it
is a fact that the specific physical characteristics of Plutonium pose
complex and delicate problems to anyone building a nuclear device.
Moreover, if Plutonium produced in nucl-ear Po\irer stations were
to be used, this would require a higher level of sophistication in
design and in the construction of the nuclear device.
If would be physically simpler to use highly enriched uranium, but
to obtain this one must possess or have access to an enrichment plant.
Clearly then nuclear weapons cannot be built unless the advanced.
technological structuEes required are available-
c-INEg-E-99!91-stig!s-g!-tb9-!9s!!Is31--IrElgs-9E-Pr91-lEsse!rel
53. sriefly (cf. aOM(80) 316 final) the report concludes that:
- 
the decision to construct nuclear weapons is essential-Iy a political
one taken by States: there may be different reasons for it and the
investment costs are high;
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the use of plant designed for the peaceful use of nuclear energy and
the diversion from it of fissile material is not the simplest nor the
most convenient way to manufacture nuclear arms: available technology
may, however, facilitate the acquisition of the necessary know-how
for military ends;
at the present time (and for the foreseeable future) there are no
alternative nuclear cycres to those arready constructed or designed
which will ensure the non-production and thus the non-proliferation
of 'exprosive' nucrear materiars. (This rules out us hopes on this
point);
the levers of the risk of proliferation connected with the various
cycles are not comparabre in abstract because they depend not only
on the intrinsic physicar characteristics of the cycre but also on
changing externar factors which are difficurt to evaluate. For example,
the open cycre, advanced so vigorously by carter to the point where he
stopped construction of the breeder plant at crinch River, has not
been recognized as offering any particurar advantages over the otherrs;
- the dangers of proliferation may be reduced by rowering the amounts
of separated Plutonium and highly enriched Uranium i.n the fuel cyclei
- it is feasible to raise physical protection barriers around fissil-e
materials, although it may be difficult to have such a course of action
accepted;
- the danger of the diversion of explosive fissire materiar may be re-
duced by using fuel of a lower enrichment in research reactors;
- the dangers of proliferation may be lowered by installing different
nuclear fuel cycle facilities on the same site (colocation);
- fissile materiar wourd be less open to use for non-peacefur purposes
if it took the form of mixed oxides produced from mixed Uranium and
Plutonium solutions (co-conversion) 
.
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54. The conclusions above show that at the present state of the art
there is no guideline in nuclear technology or development which can
clearly identify peaceful and military uses and. make them incompatible.
They are both influeneed by the other and hence there is no magic tech-
nical means to prevent proliferation.
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What is needed is political action to forge agreemenb between
nations and organizations and to improve supervision systems.
Your rapporteur is convinced that a policy of non-proliferation
must be accompanied by a policy of nuclear and general disarmament for
it to achieve the widest concensus and create new prospects. The SIPRI
document forecasts that in 1980 world armaments expenditure will reach
a figure of $ 500,000 m (more than I, OOO EUA at current rates) . It is
utterly grotesque as well as tragic that thousands of millions of
dollars are spent every year to protect us (so they say) from conflicts,
the found.ation of which are laid by withholding such gigantic resources
from development.
55. Although a large dose of optimism is needed to deal with these dis-
heartening facts, the course of international agreement aeems to be the
only feasible one. Some of the Conference's suggestions incorporate
this approach, even though the road ahead will be a long and difficult
one, as the history of the existing treaties shows"
The treaty which imposed a partial ban on test detonations of nuclear
devices has been of questionable effectiveness and provoked much dis-
cussion. It has not prevented vertical proliferation and has never
satisfied those countries which do not have nuclear weapons. Those
that have signed the treaty in exchange for aid and assistance with their
own peaceful nuclear development have incessantly asked for changes to
be made, since they consider that all tests should be banned.
The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has, in spite of its shortcomings,
marked an important step towards controlling horizontal proliferation.
It was the first well-organized attempt to bring the matter under inter-
national control and may be compared to a piece of outline legislation
which requires implementing provisions to be adopted later on.
During the l0 years it has been in force the NPT has not, however,
been as effective as was hoped, partly because of the intrinsic weakness
of its provisions, partly because of a lack of political consistency
(it has not become'universal', Article VI on nuclear disarmament was
never implemented, Article IV on facilities to allow accesE to the benefits
of nuclear energy has been shown to have some limitations and there has
been some resistance to its application).
The Treaty was first re-examined at the Ist Review Conference in
L975, but no fundamental changes were made.
A second attempt at improvement it took place at the IInd. Review
- 33 - PE 70.A57/f in.
conference, but no fundamental changes were made.
A second attempt at improvement took place at the IInd Review Con-
ference in August 1980 in ceneva. Although it opened with a message from
the IIN Secretary-General, Mr Kurt Waldheim who said that the countries
other than the six who already possess it must be prevented from building
nuclear weapons and that the atomic aresenal must be progressively reduced
to the point where it is completely eliminated, the Conference ended in
failure. During the proceedings the representatives of the developing
countries which had signed the NPT adopted a strongly critical attitude
towards the large nuclear powers (US, USSR, IrK). These were aceused by
the representatives of the Third World of not having properly implemented
the Treaty and not having met undertakings to ban all text explosion of
nuclear bombs. The Conference chairman llr lsmat Kittani of lraq, had to
announce that the participants were abandoning their efforts to find an
agreement on new measureE to prevent nuclear proliferation and On guaranteed
supplies of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes to the developing countries.
56. This conclusion is even more serious since the INFCE Conference had
emphasized that the present non-proliferation arrangements were open to
improvement and that action was needed to minimize the dangers inherent
in the sensitive areas which had been identified and hence guarantee more
stable and uniform supplies. Having examined the various problems the
INFCE singled out some measurea of an institutional nature which might be
introduced by menas of general agreements. These include:
International Plutonium Storage (IPS) ;
fnternational Spent FueI Management (ISFM);
a Iimit on the number and the internat{onalization of i sensitive
plants such as those used for the enrichment, reprocessing and manu-
facture of Uranium-thorium fuel;
agreements to safeguard the continuity of supplies even while non-
proliferation undertakings and conditions were being up-dated;
multi-national or international decisions on the l-ocation of waste
storage sites.
It is your rapporteur's opinion that the IAEA should take a more
active role on the world scene to tackle on these problems and that
the Community should apply pressure to have it do so.
The new Comrnission of the Buropean Communities must apply itself to
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the final storage of the waste'
Between these two events' the beginning and end of the cycle'
therearealargenumberofoperations-including,ofcourse,
irradiation in the reactor to obtain energy - the number and nature




59. In principle, one could conceive of a large number of types of
reactor, single or in combination' to meet the needs of a specific
energy system. The various INFCE working grouPs considered 22 types
of reactor and corresponding fuer cycles. Many of the designs con-
sideredwereextremelyinterestinginasmuchastheyallowabetter
utilization of resources' but in the Present state of the art these
undevelopedoptionsstillonthedrawingboardwiltmostprobablynot
be feasible until after the year 2000'
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50. The term breeding covers the entire series of nuclear reactions
by which some natural non-fissile ('fertile') nuclides are bransformed
into fissile nuclides which may be used for the chain reaction within
a nuclear reactor.
6I. The only fissile nuclide found in nature is Uranium 235 (U235)
which is an isotope constituting approximately O.7% of natural Uranium'
The only known fertile nuclides are Uranium 238 (u238) which
makes up 99 .3,t, of natural Uranium and Thorir-rm 23, (r,1"') which is
the only natural isotope of this element'
There are two nuclear breeder reactions:
Pa233 Plu233 (fissire)
27d r,6.1O5y
u238 rn*_)u23e.P)nrzrs P 
'ly',::^. 
(fissile)
4,sio9y 23m ' ' 2' 33d 24'36oY
th232 + ,., 
-+rn""h
1, 4r<lroy
These reactions, which may take place in any type of reactor'
have a high yield in 'breeder reactors' which can simultaneously
produce both energy and a greater amount of fissile material than is
consumed.
62. The reaction described in the first cycle above has already been
carried out and passed from the design stage to the experimental stage
some years ago with some positive results in fast breeder reacLors
(r'rn1 .
In terms of quantity it enables the reserves of fissile material
to be multiplied by a factor of between 50 and 70. This is a guarantee
that there will be sufficient nuclear fuel available for the production
of electricity in nuclear power stations for thousands of years to come'
The technology now in existence can ensure that the doubting time in
fuel production will keep in step with the doubling time of electricity
consumpt ion.
In terms of qualitv, however, this process requires the irradiated
fuel to be recycled several times within the plant and creating the
'Plutonium economy' which has a number of important ecological, social
and political implications which it would be unpardonable to under-
e st imate.
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63. The second cycle is either still on the drawing board or in the
early experimentation phase. The us DePartment of Energy, which is
re.sponsible for R & D in the energy field, in 1978 (afi:er carterts
statements) called for greater efforts to be put into research into
this cycle. Although it holds out good ProsPects, the end results
will not be seen for some decades-
c - Es9!-Pt999sg]!g
64. Nuclear fuel is processed before and after the irradiation phase
in the reactor. The main processes preparing the fuel for use in the
reactor are concerned with isotope enrichment (indispensable for stations
using enriched uranium) and the fabrication of the fuel itself into
fuel 'elements' . When discharged from the reactor the fuel may be
'reprocessed' in order to separate the remaining Uranium and Plutonium
from the waste known as 'fission Productsr '
Enrichment and retrrocessing are two particularly critical segments
ofthe fuel cycle since it is here that the fissile materials
(u235arrd Plutonium) are obtained.
65. The isotope enrichment of Uranium raises the proportion of V235
contained in natural Uranium (approx. O.7%) to approx. 3% in the case
of uranium used in LWR reactors or more than 90% for the Uranium used
for military Purposes.
The processes used are based on the principles of gaseous dif-
fusion and centrifuging of natural uranium which, in the form of
hexafluorid.e, is a gas. Both of these Processes have been developed
industrially.
Reprocessing, as we have said, consists of all the operations to
be carried out on sPent nuclear fuel to separate the unburnt material
(and the fissile nuclides generated by breeding) from the fission products'
This process was used during the second world war for the ex-
traction of 'nuclear explosive' (Pu) but not for the recovery of Uranium'
Attheendofthewar,partlyinviewofitspotentialpeaceful
uses,thetechnologywasdevelopedandimprovedsoastobeableto
recover both the fissile comPonents, the Plutonium and the non-fissioned
Uranium, from the fuel discharged from the reactor'
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There are essentially two types of reprocessing: wet (aqueous)
and drv (non-aqueous), but about 30 or so possible methods have been
found in all.
The first type is carried out at 1ow temperature (approx. 3O-7OoC)
and involves the di.ssolving in an aqueous solution of minteral acids
of the irradiated fuer before separation of the various elements.
This has the advantage of a high degree of d.econtaminat.ion of the
fission products and has reached.a high level of development in
industrial use.
The second type covers high-temperature processes and those which
invorve haride distillation. They are carried out at temperatures
of several hundred oc, allow less decontamination of the fission
products and have not yet reached a satisfactory level of industrial
development. Their advantage lies in the fact that they can be
initiated after a very short cooling period since the greater after-
heat which would be intolerable in the wet processes, because of the
harmful effects of radiolysis on the sorvents, does not create any
serious problems here.
Fuel enrichment is not necessary for reactors using natural
Uranium or Plutonium as the initial fissile material. With the
possibility of an open (once-through) cycle, both enrichment and
reprocessing would be eliminated in the case of natural uranium re-
actors, while for reactors using slightry enriched uranium it wourd
be possible to dispense with reprocessing.
D - Prspgsel-9!-regrseslryc_s3s!9
66. This is the final part of the fuer cycle. our committee and the
European Parliament have recently debated this subject (weber report).
we are therefore well familiar with the technical aspects of this
question and its possibre effects on hearth and the environment.
E - P999BBIS919E1!s
67. This covers all the operations involved in dismantling obsolete
nuclear plant (particutarly reactors) and restoring the site of the
plant to its original condition. This is a probrem which hras not
covered by the rNFcE. rt has only very recentry begun to receive
adquate attention; the European parliament deatt with it at some
length in the spring of L979 (Fl6mig report). Reference is made to it
here sole1y in order to complete the l-ist of the more complex technical
aspects connected with the use of nuclear energy for peacefur purposes.
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OPINION OF IIE POLITICAL AFFAIRS COMI4ITTEE - Dlaftsman: l4rs A.-M. LIZIN
At its sitting of 6 July 198I the European Parlrament referred the
results of the INFCE Conference (International Nuclear FueI Cycle Evaluatron)
to the Committee on Energy and Research as the commrttee responsible and
to the Political Affairs Committee for its opinion.
At its meeting of 27 to 29 January 1982, the Political Affairs
Committee appointed Mrs LTZIN draftsman.
At its meeting of 24 Lo 26 February 1982, the Political Affairs
Committee adopted this opinion by 15 votes to 1 with no abstentions.
The fol]owing took part in the vote: Mr Rumor, chairman; Lord Bethel1,
vice-chairmani Mrs Lizin, rapporteur; Mr Bournias, Lord Douro, lvlr Gawronski
(deputizing for Mr Bettiza), Mr llabsburg, Mr Hdnsch, Mr von Hassel,
Mr Israel (deputizing for [4r de Ia Maldne), Mrs Lenz, Mr Majonica (deputi-
zing for Mr Klepsch), Mr Moorhouse (deputizing for Sir James Scott-Hopkins),
Mr Pelikan (deputizing for Ivlr Cariglia), l'Ir Plaskovitis, Mr Segre and
Mr J.M. Taylor.
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1. The political Affarrs Commlttee must assess the report by [4r VERONES]
in the context of international relations and the impticatlons of the INFCE
for those refatlons. The committee must therefore pay particul-ar attention
to two aspects:
relations between the USA and Europe as regards non-proliferation, exports
of fissil-e materj-aIs and the marketing of the plutonium cyc1e,
- the implications of the results of the TNFCE Conference for North-South
reLations, particularly in respect of those Third World countries which
have turned to nuclear power and which feel that the American standpoint
has so far deprived them of their freedom and their capacity for techno-
logical development, not Lo menti-on the military aspect.
2. There is little point in considering the resufts of the INFCE Conference
from the viewpoint of i-nternationat political relations as such. It
is obvious that the INFCE prograrnme was simply a phase in the development
of nuclear relations between states, these relations having been strained
as a result of a number of earlier developments. The historical background
given in the VERONESI report is very comprehensive and so need not be
repeated here. Attention should, however, be drawn to the hiqhty restrlctive
Lerrdency oI American policy on the plutonj.um economy (Irord L976l,, the export
of fissile materials and of nuclear LechnologY (Non:proliferation Act) '
Eurrcpean dissatisfaction with these policies which compromised technological
<levelopment in Europe, the hostility of Third World countries which criticized
the extremely restrictive interpretation of the NPT and the desire to keep
them in a position of technological underdevelopment (faiture of the Geneva
Conference) and finally the appearance of international organizations (CIub
of London in 1975) which were formed by certain European countries without
regard for the procedures laid down in the Euratom Treaty.
As regards the historical background therefore, we must remember that
INFCE merely provided a'brief respiLe'before a crucial stage i! which
the interests of the seven partners clashed. This stage is now complete'
Its ,demise'should introduce the next stage in the dialogue and, 1f possible,
lead to an agreement.
3. There has been a noticeable shift in the American position.
Some important work is currently being carried out within the American
administration in order to implement the new guidelines laid down in the
presidential declaration of JuIy 198I, according to which the USA wishes
to become a reliabte partner once again wi+-hout undermining its non-
prolifere,tion objectives. And it is true that the strict system of control,
the full-scale 'nuclear police' to which the Carter administration seemed
inclined, is an ilfusion since several countries, in Europe in particular,
already possess the relevant technology. The aim, therefore, is to win
acceptance not for a ,police force',but for a form of self-dji5cipline to "
be exer.cized and supervised jointly. One element of uncertainty*rernains,
however and that is the attitude of Qongress. There is littte chance of
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the NNPA being amended. Ideally, the Administration would be inclined
to revise certain provislons, such as tirose on retrodctivity, and to transfer
responsibility for export licences from the NRC to the State Department.
However, the idea is to modify the application of the regulations rather
than to change the regulations themselves.
4. We must also take account, without going into details, of the development
of technology and the nuclear industry in the USA, which has been a major
factor in this 'softening' of policy. Ar1 that America,s policing role
has achieved is to cause it to fall further behind and to lose a large
nunber of contracts to certain European companies. Over the next few years,
competition on the foreign market will be fierce ih tnis sbctor. Ali.hough
it began with a monopoly, the usA has been unable to keep the upper hand
as regards technology and has, on the contrary, fallen werl behind.
5. owing to the different stages of development of Latin America, Africa
and Asia in the field of nuclear technology, the Third World countries
have not responded to this policy with a united front. They are, however,
united in refusing to accept a discriminatory situation which deprives
a country of the capacity for further deveLopment, even if such development
sti11 seems a doubtfur prospect. what are the deveroping countries,
criticisms of current policy and particularly of the NpT? Article IV (on
the inalienable right of every state to the development of a civil- nuclear
prograrune and the transfer of technology) has not been applied. No progress
has been made on Artlcle VI (disarmament measures). Alt attempts to call
even a temporary halt to underground nuclear tests have failed 
- it is
surely safe to assume that there has been more than just one test per week
since the NPT was signed. rt is vital the Europe take up this claim by
the least-developed countries and follow it up by specification, for example
by acting as the spokesman for some of these countries j-n deatings with
the USA to draw up a joint poticy position putting them on an equal footing
inst.ead of confronting them with policy as a fait accompri, an attitude
'vhj-ch has always exacerbated their hostility in the past. such support
would be hi.ghly appreciated by many countries and would reinforce Europers
roLe in ttris aspect of the North-South dial-ogue.
6. Europe does not have a common approach to these problems, either in
discussions or in practice, and this is sometimes to its detriment. one
Member State and one applicant country have not ratified the NpT; another
Member State does not accept the IAEA's full scope safeguards. There was
even a brief period of serj-ous conflict between the Member States over
non-proliferation and export controls following the creation of the Club
of London when some countries took part in the drafting of restrictive
standards at the expense of free movement and in contravention of the general
principles of the Euratom Treaty. However, the toughening of American
attitudes and in particular the adoption of the NNPA, which effectivell,
made it necessary for arl bilaterar agreements to be renegotiated, was
-42- PE 7o.857fin.
seen throughout Europe and in Japan as an imposition which would be hard
to accept. It is crucial that Europe's assessment of the'post-INFCE period'
should be organized through Community channels. Bilateraf rel-atlons do
exist and it would be unrealistic to think that they wj-I] disappear.
Nonetheless, the Ten member States must harmonize their response to American
polj.cy and the softer l-ine now emerging in order to arrive at the best
possible policy. The PoIiticaI Affairs Committee feel-s that any move towards
preferential agreements between a few Member States, keeping the remaining
Member States in a position of inferiority, would constitute a threat to
the future of Europe. Some observers feel'that the role of Euratom's safeguards
is fading, whi.ch would be regrettable, and that internationallV the safeguards
rvhich are used as a reference are those of the IAEA. The new quidelines may be
considered under three headings: the plutonium cyc1e, policy on the export of fis-
sile materials and nuclear technologv and Lhe international system of safeguards.
j. As regards plutonium, work has reached an advanced stage, having been
given priority by the American adminrstration. The EEC had special status
('waiver', which is currently being renewed) but would like to see the
matter clari-fied. In our opinion, Europe must support the USA in this
matter and share its concern for controls but it must also make it understood
that this policy cannot be uniformly applied, particularly in relation
to the electricity generating needs of individual countries and their reli-
ability in respect of non-proliferation. This presupposes an effort on
the part of European countries to make their concern for technological
development and commercialization compatible with their support for an
essential policy of non-proliferation.
8. As regards the export of sensitive materials, the American administration
has re-established contacts with the various exporting countries and with
Euratom as an official organization. These contacts were, for the most
part, bilateral. These American tactics are clearly governed by self-
interest, the aim being to divide and ru1e. This makes the need to determine
a concerted policy within the Ten in response to this policy towards exports
of materials and technology more obvious than ever. The new Belgian
presidency should ensure that work in this field is completed and call
on the Commission to be more vigilant in respect of the Euratom Treaty.
The need for stricter controls is obvious and acceptabl-e to Europe since
it is the sole means of limiting and slowing down the process of proliferation.
The policies of peace and disarmament are also fundamental in reducing
the appeal of acqulring nuclear weapons (Middle East). On no account,
however, should Europe lay itself open to the obvious criticism from the
,grey zone, countries that they are setting up yet another rich men's club.
We must not go back to the situation of the Club of London but should set
up a temporary ad hoc committee to consj-der exports on a case-by-case basis
in a global context. Europe could promote consideration of a special status
tor some or alL importing countrics ollering cottsiderable flexibility.
This would make it possible to determine the outlines of a definitive solution
in a worl-dwide context.
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9. On the question of international systems of safeguards, attention
should be drawn to the crucial role of the IAEA and the importance of
improving it. Such an improvement could be brought about by additional
funds from the European countries and particularly from Lhe USA but also
by greater political involvement in the success of two initiatives:
1. International Plutonium Storage (IPS) whose work is
progressing satisf actorily ;
2. The Committee on Assurance of Supply (CAS) which is trying to
establish rules for a new worl-dwide system to guarantee supplies.
So far its work has been unsatisfactory and it must act quickly
to find some means of avoiding the dilemma of irrevocable supply
versus irrevocable safeguards' .
Finally, the UN intends to hold an International Conference on Nuclear
Energy in 1983 which could provide an opportunity to submit new proposals.
Europe should combine its efforts in preparation for this conference.





the INFCE Conference. As far as our committee is concerned, the important
thing is to have convinced the American administration of the need to adopt
a more flexible aPProach'
3.Europehasanimportantroletoplayinthedevelopmentswhichmust
necessarily follow the INFCE conference, as it had on many issues throughout
the conference, both in relation to the d'eveloping countries and to the
USA.
4.Europemustnotforgetitscommitmenttodisarmamentpolicywhich
is the cornerstone of the NPT (Article VI) (paragraph 13(a) of the VERONESI
I-apil!). It also hopes for a ban on underground tests (paragraph 13(b)
of t.he VERONESI report) '
5.Europemustreaffirmj-tsconcernforunrestrictedapplicationof
Article VI of the NPT which allows technological developmen! in countries
notequippedwithnuclearweaponsinallmattersretatingtotheuseof
nuclearenergyforpeacefulpurposes(paragrapht3(a)oftheVERoNESIreport).
some financial incentj.ve should be added to improve this section so vital
for the Third world countries which might otherwise withdraw from the system





confrontation. This new American policy is a chatlenge to which Europe
must respond by accepting a rmodus vivendi"
T.Thisdesireforunderstandingandacceptancepresupposesamovement
towards a stricter system (the total ban referred to in Paragraph 13(c)
of the VERONESI rePort) to which we subscribe'
S.ltisinEurope'sj-nteresttogiveconcretesupporttotheroleof
the Third world in this field and we should stress the need for specific
case-by-caseconsiderationofexportstoeachcountryonthebasisofa
flexibre arrangement which wourd not discriminate against importing countries
or impose condi-tions on them which they did not help to draw up' The acceptance
of safeguards must include a provision for guaranteed supplies '
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9. Europe must play an actlve part ln extending and lmproving the Euratom
and IAEA systems of safeguard (paragraphs 14(i) and 14(j) of the VERoNESI
report). It should also consider positive measures leading to the completion
of the work of the IPS and CAS. Member States cannot, however, be associated
with measures which are incompatible with the rules laid down in the Treaty,
particularly in relation to the internal market or the free movement of
goods, or which exclude the European institutions.
10. The Political Affairs Committee welcomes the fact that a study group
has been set up within the Council wj.thin the framework of political coopera-
tion to prepare a joint policy position by the Ten on non-proliferation and
the harmonization of nuclear export policy. The Ten's procedures must be
respected in respect of all advances in this field and joint initiatives
must be taken in relation to the group of 17 in preparation for the United
Nations Conference on nuclear energy to be held in 1983.
The PoliticaI Affairs Committee hopes that the Belgian Presidency
will act as a motivating force in this field.
fn conclusion, the Politica1 Affairs Committee feels that it would be
appropriate to amplify the report by Mr VERONESI by including two amendments




Insert the following Paragraph I2a:
- Hopes that the conclusions of the INECE Conference wiII firmly
establish a positive c1j-mate between the USA and Europe in relation
to their common goal of nuclear non-proliferation and between Europe
and the Third World in the desire to provide mutual help in gaining
access to this 20th century technology.
Insert the fol-Iowing paragraph l4a:
- Strcssos it-s commitment to Community procedures and, in particularn
rts hopes for a positive outcome of political cooperation activities
in the field of non-proliferation and ca1ls for the preparation of
('omrTrunity proposals in the context of thc Unit-ed Nations Conference
on nrrclear encrgy to be held in t983-
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